

UNCLASSIFIED when blank – TOP SECRET when attached to Top Secret Document – When detached from document regrade cover sheet as appropriate. Attach to each CIA and Non-CIA collateral Top Secret document maintained by CIA.

CIA TOP SECRET CONTROL NUMBER		CIA COPY/SERIES NUMBER		DOCUMENT DATE (YYMMDD)
Office	TS 165211 Number	59 Year	1 Copy	5903 20 Series
NON-CIA DOCUMENT RECEIPT DATE (YYMMDD)		COLLATERAL TS ATTACHMENT(S)—Control Numbers		LOGGED BY:

NON-CIA ORIGINATOR (Dept, Agency) Control No., Copy No.

ATTENTION: Access to the attached document is restricted to only authorized recipients or Top Secret control personnel. For accountability purposes, all designated individuals are to sign and date this form.

[illegible]

Remove this sheet upon completion of any action noted below, classify form, and forward to the CIA Top Secret Control Officer.

DOWNGRADED	DESTROYED	DISPATCHED TO (Non-CIA Agency)
TO	BY (Signature)	TO
BY (Signature)	WITNESSED BY (Signature)	BY (Signature)
DIRECTORATE & OFFICE	DIRECTORATE & OFFICE	DIRECTORATE & OFFICE
DATE	DATE	DATE

~~TOP SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED WHEN BLANK
 CONTROL SHEET FOR TOP SECRET DOCUMENT (COLLATERAL)
 (Top Secret Control Automated Data System (TSCADS) Data Entry Copy)

CIA TOP SECRET CONTROL NUMBER		CIA COPY/SERIES NUMBER		DOCUMENT DATE (YYMMDD)
TS 165211		59 /		5903 20
Office	Number	Year	Copy	Series
NON-CIA DOCUMENT RECEIPT DATE (YYMMDD)		COLLATERAL TS ATTACHMENT(s)—Control Numbers		
		LOGGED BY:		
SUBJECT/TITLE:				
CIA ORIGINATOR (Directorate, Office, Division, Branch)		NON-CIA ORIGINATOR (Dept, Agency) Control No., Copy No.		

TOP SECRET CONTROL OFFICER TO ENTER INFORMATION INTO TSCADS
 DESTROY COPY FOLLOWING SYSTEM INFORMATION ENTRY

~~TOP SECRET~~

Cy #1
Chirono

20 March 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Requirement for a Contingency Estimate on Reactionsto
Certain Courses of Action re Berlin

1. At a meeting in Assistant Secretary Irwin's office this morning (I attended vice Mr. Amory) Mr. Smith of State brought up a State Department memorandum on Berlin policy approved by the President on 17 March.

2. Paragraph 4c of this memorandum calls for State-Defense and CIA to do by 7 April an analysis of the political and military implications of four alternative courses of action if there is interference with our access to Berlin. The idea was to do an exercise similar to NSC 147 of 2 April 1953 (although the new one would not necessarily be an NSC paper).

3. The JCS, which apparently had hoped to do this whole exercise by themselves and then submit it to State and possibly CIA for comment, will probably go along with the above procedure. However, JCS will not have its analysis of the military aspects of the four courses of action ready until 26 March.

4. Consequently we agreed that the State-Defense-CIA group would hold a meeting on Thursday the 26th at which we would each table our preliminary papers with an idea to early dovetailing and clearing up for submission by 7 April.

5. In essence what seems to be called for is another SE 41 (Probable Communist Reactions to Certain Possible US Courses of Action in Korea, 2 April 1953) which was our contribution to NSC 147. However, the question of whether a coordinated SNIE is required could be postponed for a few days. Nevertheless, even though we do not have any detailed spelling out of the four courses of action beyond the attached extract from the State memo of 17 March, it seems to me that we must start immediately to prepare a draft based on the attachment, using our judgment as to what the details might be. I have been promised any further dope that JCS can provide in the interim. My suggestion would be that we have a Board cleared draft ready by Wednesday the 25th and that we use the subsequent week for coordinating it if necessary.

6. What is wanted is an estimate (a la SE 41) of a: Bloc reactions and, b: world-wide reactions to the four positive courses of action. It should cover not just the reactions after we initiate the courses of action but also the deterrent and other impact during the buildup period to the reaction itself.

7. For beginning assumptions we can take the following:

- a. negotiations have taken place but have failed or are deadlocked;
- b. there has been interference with our access to Berlin (it was felt that there was no need to define this too precisely;
- c. the West Germans do not participate in any military courses of action while the UK and French support us but may not be directly involved either.

8. If it is decided to make this a SNIE DCI probably should inform the IB, perhaps in Executive Session on Tuesday.

R. W. KOMER

N.B. Obviously this matter, being extremely sensitive, should be handled on the strictest need-to-know basis.

~~TOP SECRET~~Excerpt from Memorandum for the President, dated March 17, 1959

4. The following steps are now recommended for your approval:

(c) We recommend that you ask the Departments of State and Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and CIA to prepare for you on an urgent basis an analysis of the political and military implications of the four alternative courses of action with respect to the use of force, discussed in paragraph 7 below. We suggest a deadline of April 7. You may recall that a similar study proved useful in connection with the Korean War (NSC 147 of April 2, 1953).

7. Alternative uses of force.

(a) Recent discussions between State and Defense officials confirmed agreement that we should be prepared to resort to force if necessary to maintain access to Berlin -- even at the risk of general war.

(b) Four alternative uses of force, in the event of failure of political negotiations, have been discussed:

(1) A substantial effort to reopen ground access by local action.

(11) A

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

-2-

(ii) A substantial effort to reopen air access, if blocked.

(iii) Reprisals against the communists in other areas, e.g., Western naval controls on bloc shipping.

(iv) General war measures.

(c) In paragraph 4(c) above, we recommended that you direct preparation of an analysis of the implications of these alternative courses of action on an urgent basis.

~~TOP SECRET~~